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THE POLITICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE 
MAURICE MULLARD 
INTRODUCTION 
In outlining the priorities for the EU at the Florence Summit in June 1996 
the President of the Commission Jacques Santer echoed the view of the late 
Fronc;ois Mitterand and suggested that reducing unemployment had to become 
the major policy objective for the Union. Mitterand believed that enthusiasm 
for the principles of the EU was in decline and had to be regained. Reducing 
unemployment was therefore essential if the EU was to be of direct relevance 
to the people of the EU. However, there are major disagreements between the 
EU strategy for reducing unemployment and that being preferred by nation 
states. Even at the conference in Florence for example the President of the 
Commission failed to get agreement to use the projected underspend from 
agriculture for infrastructure projects, instead nation states preferred to use 
the funds to reduce their own national public sector deficits. The UK Prime 
Minister John Major, speaking to The Turning Back Group Conservatives on 
3 February 1995 echoed the objectives the Governor of the Bank England. The 
latter ahd suggested that the EMU criteria which tended to concentrate on 
monetary policy had also to include unemployment as a condition for economic 
convergence. Whilst the levels of unemployment do represent a major policy 
challenge to Europe the central concern of this chapter is whether 
unemployment as an issue is likely to become a major political priority for 
Europe in the 1990s. It the unemployed are not to become a major social 
excluded category from European citizenship the objective of reducing 
unemployment must become a major policy objective for Europe. 
'During the 1970s, unemployment in the Community crept from 3% to 6%, 
but then rose to between 10% and 11 % from 1983 to 1987. It dipped to between 
8% and 9% towards the end of the decade, before rising to 10% again in 1992. 
To reverse this process will require a fundamental revolution in prevailing 
attitudes of thought and approaches to economy policy' (Grieve Smith 1994p259) 
Within the EU at present there are some 20 million unemployed using the 
ILOIOECD definition of unemployment - this represents about 12 per cent of 
the European labour force. The problem of unemployment for Europe is not 
just the rate of unemployment but the persistence and duration of 
unemployment. Europe has now experienced continuing high levels of 
unemployment since the early 1980s. It is estimated that the costs in terms of 
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unemployment benefits amounts to some 200 bn ECU, the equivalent of the 
GDP of Belgium. Yet this is an underestimate of the real costs in terms of lost 
production and loss of tax revenues to government. Furthermore, the levels 
of unemployment are a major constraint on public finances. On a more global 
perspective the ILO (ILO 1995) estimates that there are now some 86 million 
people unemployed - a situation which is both morally and economically 
unsustainab le. 
At one level it seems paradoxical that unemployment in the 1990s continues 
to be a major challenge for Europe taking into consideration the optimism which 
surrounded the completion of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. Both 
the European Commission and the Cecchini Report (1988) were then able to 
emphasise that the completion of the Single European Market in 1992 would 
result in an increase of the GDP of th EU. This increase of 200 bn ECU 
equivalent to 7 per cent increase of the EU GDP was likely to reduce EU 
unemplyment by 5 millon as the Commission noted at the time. 
Among the various indicators of success (of SEM), the most crucial today 
is that relating to employment (Commission 1988 p 166). This view was 
reinforced further in the Cecchini Report which stated, that 'perhaps most 
important of all, is the medium term impact of market integration on 
employment. With its injection of inflation free growth, coupled with a loosening 
of the constraints on public exchequers in the Community' member states, the 
European home market of the 1990s raises the prospect, for the first time since 
the early 1970s, of very substantial job creation' (Cecchini 1988, XIX). 
The SEA (Single European ACT) committed member states to the free 
movement of labour, goods, capital and services. The single market committed 
governments to removing barriers and subsides and to allow for increases in 
trade and competition. Those in favour of the SEM pointed out that this would 
reduce the costs, to companies in terms of transaction costs bureaucracy and 
delays. Furthermore the phasing out of state subsides to industries would 
provide governments with additional finances which could be used to reflate 
their economies. Finally, it was pointed out that competition would increase 
consumer' choice, reduce costs and prices and reduce inefficiency. 
What is crucial to remember is that the European Commission was aware 
that the SEA was likely to result in job displacements and re-structuring because 
of the presesures of competition. However the SEA over the medium term was 
likely to result in a net increase of 1.8 million new jobs. This figure though 
would not be sufficient to bring about any significant reduction in the current 
unemployment figure, since the unemployment rate would fall by only 1 to 
2 per centage points in the medium term, (Commission 1988, p162). However 
essential to the Commission's argument was the added commitment by 
government to re-direct public expenditures from subsidies to fiscal policy. It 
was the policy of fiscal co-ordination which was likely to result in an increase 
of 5.2 million additional jobs. 
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Asking what went wrong with the Commission's prediction on SEM in 1988 
leads to two types of answers. First it might be argued that the studies conducted 
by the Commission in 1988 tended to be over-baised towards SEM and the 
studies therefore produced the result the Commission was looking for 
(Neuberger 1989, Cutler 1989). In this context the studies overestimated the 
benefits of SE M and did not take into account problems of consumer taste and 
market fragmentation.Furthermore increased competitiveness was more likely 
to lead to job losses, the downsizing of companies a'1d labour market re-
adjustment. The Commission had tended to assume that people displaced in 
one industry would be absorbed in another sector: Secondly it might be argued 
that the Commission was over optimistic on the extent to which there would 
be political willingness amongst governments to expand their economies 
through fiscal policies. The Commission assumed that a Keynesian economic 
consensus still existed when most countries had already embraced the economics 
of market liberalism and monetarism. 
Unemployment since the 1980s has not been of major political concern. 
Governments have succeeded in holding on to office despite the high levels 
of unemployment. This has be contrasted to the 1960s and 1970s when increases 
in unemployment were seen as morally and politically unacceptable. In the 1980s 
high levels of unemployment became politically tolerable and government 
became increasingly complacement- unemployment reduction was no longer 
a major policy objective. Governments became involved in the politics of 
contentment (Galbraith 1993) which meant that as long as government ensured 
that they protected or increased the living standards of the working majority 
the unemployment would not become a political threat. 
RECESSION AND DEPRESSION IN THE 1980s AND 1990s 
In 1996 Germany recored the highest rate of unemployment since 1948. 
In that year unemployment reached 4,4m. By contrast in 1996, the 
unemployment rate in the UK had fallen to 2.2 million or 8 per cent of the total 
workforce. In West Germany between 1973 and 1980 some 900,000 jobs were 
lost in manufacturing and engineering, and 500,000 in agriculture, whilst the 
total working population fell from 26.6m to 25.8m. In the UK the shake out 
of the early 1980s resulted in a loss of 2m jobs in manufacturing. France has 
endured the longest period of mass unemployment. Here unemployment has 
not fallen below 10 per cent since the mid 1980s. In 1996 the unemployment 
rate in France rose 3,3 million which represented 13 per cent of the total 
workforce despite the fact that the economy has expanded by 2.5per cent during 
that year. The government of President Chirac elected in 1995 has tried to use 
capital expenditure on housing, and subsidies to employers during 1995 in order 
to raise employment fugures. But the policy was revered in 1996 as the 
government tried to regain control over public expenditure in order to meet 
the EMU critieria in 1997. 
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Since 1984 a neo classical discourse has become increasingly the paradigm 
in Europe. There has emerged a widespread view that Europe. Because of age 
and tradition, conditions of work were not changing fast enough to meet the 
challenges of a changing economic context when compared to the more flexible 
labour markets of the US and Japan. The implicit agenda seems to indicate that 
Europe needs to expose labour markets to competition and emulate US supply 
side economics. One often cited statistic for example, suggested that the whilst 
in the US between 1972 and 1990 real wages had grown by 0.4 per cent a year, 
real wages in Europe had grown by 1.5 per cent a year. As a consequence it 
is argued that during the same period the US was able to create 8 million new 
jobs, whilst in Europe there had been no increase in the labour force 
participation rates. There is however a small caveat, whilst the US had the most 
de-regulated labour market and low unionisation during the 1970s the US 
unemployment rates was continuously higher to that of Europe secondly that 
the employment gains since 1986 were secured primarily through the 
proliferation of low paid, low productivity, part time service sector jobs 
(Applebaum and Schettkat 1991}.Accordingly it was argued that unemployment 
in Europe was the result of workers pricing themselves out of jobs, and what 
government needed to do was to remove rigidties from the labour market and 
make the labour market more flexible. 
Most countries seem to have accepted the new language of competitiveness. 
Germany has produced easier rules on unfair dismissal whilst France eased 
procedures on hiring and firing restrictions combined with reducing 
unemployment benefits. The Netherlands introduced reforms on redundancy 
and unemployment benefit cut. Belgium has reduced the period for dismissal 
notices, In the UK the Government produced a series of trade union reforms, 
cut back social security, reduced income taxes and emphasised a policy which 
sought to improve the supply side of labour markets. 
Whilst unemployment did increase in most of the EU countries since the 
early 1980s, there were differences both in the way unemployment was 
experienced and handled in different countries. UK unemployment in 1982-83 
reached 3.3 million or 14 per cent of labour force, whilst unemployment in 
Germany also increased but not at the same rate - never going beyond 8 per 
cent. Taking the period 1979 to 1994 into account only Ireland and Belgium 
recorded higher levels of unemployment than the UK. Whilst all European 
countries experienced two recessions between 1980 and 1992, the recessions 
in the UK were always deeper. 
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A number of explanations have been given about the nature of 
unemployment in Europe. These have included arguments about the 
relationships between unemployment and wage costs in Europe when compared 
with the US and Japan, and also the relationship between unemployment and 
non labour costs. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s whilst wage costs in 
the US remained either stationary or declined, wages in Europe continued to 
expand. In the meantime the US has created more jobs than Europe. Both the 
EU and OECD have suggested recently that Europe needs to reduce its labour 
costs. There is however a different lesson to be learned from the US experience. 
Whilst the European countries continued to reduced their public sector deficits 
in the 1980s, reducing it by 5 per cent, unemployment in Europe continued 
to expand, However, the US increased its public sector deficit and also managed 
to keep employment stable. 
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Unemployment in Europe 1970 - 1994 
Whilst other studies (Bean 1993) Romer(1993) Teague (1994) have sought 
to locate explanations of unemployment within the perspectives of New 
Keynesianism and De-Regulated Labour Markets (Teague 1994) this chapter 
seeks to outline four major perspectives of unemployment. The major difference 
is that this paper seeks to draw out the issues of trade unions, collective 
bargaining and corporatism and into the category of institutional explanations. 
Other authors alternatively have put these explanations within a New Keynesian 
perspective. Finally this paper also provides a structural perspective which is 
separate from the concept of markets and de-regulation. 
THE NEO CLASSICAL VIEW OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
According to this approach the major causes of unemployment are due to 
rigidities in the labour market, and governmental inability to provide reforms 
which are likely to improve both the demand side and labour supply. The Neo-
classical view is mainly associated with the work of Friedman and Minford, 
and the dual concepts of the natural rate of unemployment and the non 
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). The argument in a 
nutshell is that any attempt by government to reduce the natural rate of 
unemployment is likly to be dissipated in higher inflation. The natural rate 
of unemployment is not stable but moves according to change in labour costs, 
and as labour costs increase the natural rate of unemployment is therefore also 
likely to increase. If the government wants to reduce the natural rate of 
unemployment than it has to reduce labour costs, such policy however cannot 
be achieved without a policy that succeeds in curbing inflation, since it is 
inflation which influences wage bargaining and also increases non wage labour 
costs. 
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DEMAND SIDE 
Demand for labour depends on the costs of hiring labour, and these include 
both direct and indirect labour costs. Direct labour costs include wage costs 
and employers contributions to social protection. Employers it is argued will 
hire more labour at lower labour costs and therefore the role of government 
is to provide a climate in which labour costs can fall. This raises the question 
of why labour costs rise, which in turn lead to research into the relationship 
between inflation, unemployment and government expenditure. According to 
Rational Expectations prospective workers as rational agents, bargain on wages 
according to the excepted rate of inflation. If inflation is likely to rise in the 
future then workers-will bargain to obtain wage increase which offset inflation. 
Workers as rational agents know that increases in government expenditure and 
higher levels government borrowing are likely to be inflationary. They therefore 
bargain for wages accordingly thus offsetting any attempt by government to 
increase employment through demand management. 
Accordingly a neoclassical view demand management policy will not 
succeed in reducing unemployment since this is likely to be inflationary. 
Improving the demand side for labour will succeed if there is reduction in labour 
costs either through falling wages, or higher levels of productivity or lower 
non wage labour costs. The policy agendas implicitly includes reducing 
employers costs on national insurance, and reducing taxes, to allow workers 
to increase their take home pay without putting pressures on wage costs. 
SUPPLY SIDE ECONOMICS 
Reform of the supply side includes four areas of reform 
(a) Trade UnionReform 
The raison d'etre of trade unions is to restrict labour supply since only by 
restricting labour supply can trade unions influence wages. Government needs 
to reforms. trade unions, removing trade union immunities and thereby creating 
a more flexible labour supply side. 
(b) Social Security 
High levels of social security payment provide a disincentive to work, and 
increases the duration of unemployment as workers tend to spend more time 
in job search. If governments want to reduce unemployment duration then it 
needs to provide lower levels of social security payments. A typical example 
of the association between the provision of welfare and employment is as 
outlined below by Anthony de Jasay in the Financial Times on 20 January 1994 
(A vicious circle of social kindness). Unemployment in Europe where the welfare 
system is more costly per head is twice as high as in the US-and many times 
higher than East Asia. 
According to De Jasay the welfare state as a form of social protection is 
not well explained. People feel that others are paying for social protection, whilst 
at the margin the cost outweight the subsidy. Unemployment is born out of 
social protection and as unemployment increases taxes also increases which 
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leads to further unemployment. S Brittan has also argued that workers do not 
take into consideration the social wage in their bargaining with employers. 
Crossland also argued that attempts to finance welfare expenditures through 
higher taxes is likly to lead to higher inflation since workers seek to compensate 
for their loses in disposal income without taking into account any improvements 
in social wage. 
In contrast Ms Vasso Papandreu in her attempt to promote the Social 
Chapters pointed out that: "We have a moral obligation to set minimum 
standards in order not to allow market forces or wild capitalism to function 
at the cost of workers. If we want to have the kind of societies they have in 
South East Asia, then we should do that openly. But I don't think that's 
acceptable at the European level" (Interview with FT 29 Nov 91 Greek Socialist 
Flying workers flag). 
DISCRIMINATION IN LABOUR MARKETS 
Both gender and race discrimination also influence labour supply and 
governments needs to provide anti discriminatory frameworks which will 
improve labour supply and also allow wages to fall. The European 
Unemployment Programme came to the following conclusion in 1987, 'The 
major problen in Europe is that productivity gains are quickly absorbed into 
wages and the effect of unemployment on wages settlements is generally weak'. 
Europe does suffer from a different degree of labour market rigidifies, and 
whilst prices and wages do change, this is not fast enough to create market 
clearing conditions for unemployment to fall. Secondly, Europe is more inflation 
prone due to the wage price spiral. Thirdly Europe is also more vulnerable 
to external economic environment in contrast to US which is in a more 
monoploy position. 
An examination by Ormerod (1994) on the relationship between inflation 
and unemployment led the author to conclude that the concept of NAIRU was 
deeply flawed and that there was at most a very weak relationship between 
th twin variables of inflation and unemployment. For example studies in Europe 
confirmed that in only three countries was there the anticipated negative sign 
between unemployment and inflation, and in only one country was the result 
significant at the 5 per cent level. The studies show also that higher inflation 
reduces unemployment. 
KEYNESIAN DEMAND MANAGEMENT 
The core assumption associated with a Keynesian view of unemployment 
is that unemployment exists because of a decline in overall demand. This 
argument suggests that since the early 1980s governments in Europe made the 
control of inflation their major policy objective without thinking of the 
implications for unemployment. It is an argument which suggests that 
governments tended to accept the monetarists view which pointed out that 
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reducing demand through the control of the money supply at no cost output. 
The move towards EMS convergence in the early 1980s as a means of controlling 
the money supply meant that countries had to increase interest rates irrespective 
of the conditions of the domestic economy, which eventually led to higher 
interest rates and overvaluation of European currencies. The over valuation 
of currencies in the UK, France and Ireland made these economies less 
competitive and accelerated the rate of unemployment. 
The 1980s also saw the phasing out of Keynesian demand management. 
The reponse to the oil prices shocks of 1972-73 and 1980-81 resulted in 
governments pursuing more national economic policies rather than policy co-
ordination with a number of countries. The result meant a monetary policy, 
high interest rates and the downgrading of fiscal policy. Both the UK Labour 
Government in the 1970s, and the Mitterand Government in France during the 
early 1980s soon found they could not go for expansion to reduce unemployment. 
Commenting on the recession of the early 1980s Layard concluded that 
policies in the 1980s have therefore tended to be deflationary. Until this deflation 
of demand is moderated, the hopes for unemployment are poor. For the quickest 
way to raise employment is to spend more now, and accept that inflation will 
continue at the present level. (Layard 1986 p33) 
The criteria outlined for EMU are likely to lead to further deflation as 
countries continue to reduce budget deficits and inflation rates to meet the 
convergence criteria by 1997. This approach to convergence suggests that at 
minimum, governments in Europe will continue to make inflation their major 
policy objective without thinking about the consequences for employment. This 
for the foreseeable future the high levels of unemployment in Europe will 
continue. 
STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS 
According to this view, unemployment in Europe needs to be located within 
the wider context of changes in the global economy. This approach points to 
the limits of Keynesian demand management suggesting that any changes in 
demand have little impact on structural or 'Hard-core' unemployment (Brittan 
1995). One major structural change has been the dislocation in manufacturing, 
where Europe has lost some 5.5 million jobs since 1981, whilst not being able 
to repalce these jobs in the service sector. The decline in manufacturing 
employment confirms that since 1980 EC manufacturing employment which 
fell from 28.9 per cent of the total workforce to 24.4 percent in contrast to the 
US decline from 22.8 per cent to 19.1 per cent, and Japan from 25.5 per cent 
to 24.7 per cent. The study also confirms that the major job losses in 
manufacturing took place in the UK which lost a total of 2 million jobs which 
also makes up 40 per cent of the total jobs losses in Europe. Aldocroft (1993) 
has argued that Europe in the 1980s experienced Jobless growth, in that though 
the Economies in Europe did continue to expand throughout the 1980s the new 
prosperity did not lead to increases in employment. 
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Jobless growth therefore seems to have been a peculiar feature of the major 
Western nations. Estimates suggest that a rate of growth of around 2-2.5 per 
cent a year is required before employment responds positively. Thus on the 
basis of a continuation of growth rates of around 3 per cent a year, as 
experienced in the late 1980s, and a labour force growth of 0.4 per cent a year, 
unemployment levels would continue to remain high, around 6 per cent, through 
to the mid 1990s. In other words, a return to the former low levels of 
unemployment of the post-war years would require much higher rates of 
economic growth than have been the case over the last few years' (Aldcroft, 
1993, p235). 
In the context of the experiences of the 1990s it would seem that Aldcroft's 
predictionis rather too optimistic. The author did not predict the recession of 
the late 1980s. Europe did not continue to experience growth rates of 3 per 
cent a year, in fact growth fell to 1 per cent a year for the years 1989-1992 which 
has left Europe with unemployment levels of 10 per cent and not 6 per cent 
as Aldcroft predicted. 
However, the problem with the structural perspective is that it tends to 
provide a snapshot of the here and now. Peter Robinson (1994) has suggested 
that most of the structural changes have now been taking place for nearly 40 
years. There has not been for example a dramatic increase in part time 
employment in the 1980s. In fact the expansion in part time employment has 
actually slowed down in the 19808 when compared to the previous three decades. 
Furthermore there has not been an expansion in low paid employment, but 
more of an expansion in the professions and managment. 
THE STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE IS ASSOCIATED WITH THREE BROAD 
STRATEGIES 
(a) A do Nothing strategy. This is an argument which suggest that 
government cannot influence the global economy. Manufacturing is now firmly 
located within the emerging Asian Tigers against whom Europe cannot 
compete. The jobs losses in manufacturing are permanent and Europe has 
therefore to adjust to this structural change by providing social security benefits 
to those whose lives have been disrupted. It is an approach which suggest that 
governments should abandon policies of economic growth since such policies 
are no longer environmentally sustainable. Furthermore it is an approach which 
suggest that governments should concern themselves more with redistribution 
and educating people for life. 
(b) Investment in Human Capital by providing training or education to 
ensure that people are absorbed into new sectors. People who are vulnerable 
to unemployment are those with low skills. Governments need to provide 
opportunities for reskilling and the upgrading of skills of the present workforce. 
Jeremy Rifkin (1995) "The End of Work" has argued that the impact of new 
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technologies, computerisation, telecommunications, and robotics have made 
millions of jobs redundant. Retraining in new skills is therfore a myth since 
the jobs no longer exist. 
(c) State promotion of new investment in new technology industries 
improved European communications including the trans European network 
supporting high technology projects which keep Europe at the forefront of 
research. 
(d) A social cohesion fund to provide additional funds to regions which 
experience high levels of unemployment to bring about adjustment and 
structural change 
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 
There are a number of strands to this approach, but there are a number 
of core assumptions which seem to constitute the home domain of an 
institutional perspective. According to an institutional perspective the aim is 
to explain differences rather than similarities so that although there is a problem 
of unemployment in Europe the problem is not experienced similarly in all 
countries. Throughout the 1980s compared to other European countries Sweden 
experienced very low levels of unemployment. Unemployment in Sweden 
during the 1980s was similar to the levels of unemployment in Europe during 
the 1960s. Whilst France, the UK, Belgium, and Italy experienced mass 
unemployment- UK exceeeding 10 per cent of the workforce most of the 1980s, 
German unemployment peaked at 8.5 per cent. 
According to Therborn (1986) the major factor which seeks to explain the 
divergence in unemployment has been the extent to which the commitment 
to full employment has been institutionalised within the political process. 
The existence or non-existence of an institutionalised commitment to full 
employment is the basic explanation for the differential impact of the current 
crisis' (Therborn, 1986, p 23). 
Therborn defines an institutionalised commitment to full employment as 
follows: 
1. The commitment to full employment is an explicit policy objective of 
government. A number of governments produced a series of White Papers 
in the immediate post war settlement which indicated a serious commitment 
to ftill employment (Apple). 
2. The commitment of government to use fiscal and monetary policies to 
counter the economic cycle. 
3. To intervene in the labour matket to ensure full employment including 
an incomes policy creating public sector employment. 
4. A conscious decision by governments not to use high unemplyment as a 
means of containing inflation. 
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Korpi {1991} has also argued that the dominace ofleft parties in government 
have created 'societal' forms of bargaining arrangements between employers 
trade and government which have contributed to holding down the levels of 
unemployment especially when compared to those countries which committed 
themselves more to free markets and deregulated labour markets. 
Layard has for example argued that the reform of trade unions in the 1990s 
and the move towards decentralised pay bargaining have increased the pressures 
of inflation. A point taken up by both Robinson {1994} and Metcalf. Layard's 
argument is that the move towards decentralised bargaining has again rekindled 
problems to leap-frogging in wage bargening similar to those experienced in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Trade Unions are again ensuring through the process of 
decentralisation to maintain their position in the wages league. 
The work of Cormfill Drifill {1988} and Freeman {1988} seems to provide 
supporting arguments for a hump theory of corportatism. Their argument 
suggests that labour markets have performed better in those economies 
associated with high centralisation and those which have complete forms of 
decentralised bargening. Both models they suggest provide the required 
flexibility in wages to ensure minimun job losses. In countries which are neither 
completely market based nor corporatist tend to perfurm less well. Within these 
environments neither workers nor employers are committed to the maintenaIlce 
of full employment. Workers pursue sectional interest through their trade unions 
- pay bargaining is characterised by leapfrogging and wage drift. Workers seem 
to accept the axiom of the market without taking into consideration the 
implications of their actions for employment. 
The problem with both these studies is that they seek to give the expression 
to the concept of corporatism is in place by proving a measure or proxy variable 
for corporatism. The problem is that corporatism as a concept is associated 
with a different meaning. It includes ideas of centralisation in wage bargaining 
but it also includes participation in decision making by strategic groups. 
Corporatism exists also at many levels, at the level of industry, sector, region 
or the in macro economy. 
The institutional perspective can be described as Keynesian plus 
Institutional Economics. It is a perspective whcih recognises that Keynesian 
economics alone cannot maintain full employment without other policies which 
seek to deal with wages and inflation. It is a perspective which is associated 
with the concepts of consensus building, social partnerships and dialogue as 
being the alternatives to the impersonal workings of the market economy. 
THE CONVERGENCE OF LANGUAGE 
One of the safest assertions that can be made about the 1980s and early 
1990s is that there has been a major shift in economic policy making both at 
the intellectual and the practical levels. At the intellectual level there has been 
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a paradigm shift from the Keynesian consensus of the post war to a more market 
and Neo classical perspective, which has had major implications for evaluating 
policy options and the making of policy. 
This shift in ideas has also had a major influence on policy making 
institutions at the level of national government, Europe and international 
institutions. A close study of documents produced recently by the OECD and 
the EU reinforce to a degree the idea that governments have come to accept 
the lanuage of the NEO classical, and the view that there is need to deregulate 
labour markets as the major policy instrument to reduce unemployment. John 
Grieve Smith came to the following conculsion in his assessment of recent 
OEeD policy prescriptions. 
"Much of the play made with debt ratio etc, is really based on antagonism 
towards the growth of public expenditure as such, and nothing to do with the 
real problem of public finance. The December 1992 OECD Economic Outlook 
gave the game away by holding up the present New Zealand government's 
dismantling of the welfare state as "the leading example of how to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of all forms of public spending". It is unfortunate 
that this sort of political prejudice from an established international organisation 
should overlay any attempt to distinguish where, or to what extent, growing 
public debt could be a significant problem' (Grieve Smith, 1994 page 270). 
In their recent study the OCED (1994) urged governments to reduce costs 
including welfare costs, improve incentives, and phase out subsides to certain 
sectors. The OCED seems to have accepted the view that the levels of economic 
activity and employment are unaffected by fiscal policy and therfore tend to 
perceive public sector deficits as structural deficits. 
The European central bank governors report of April 1993 called for 
measures to reduce state spending or increase taxes to avoid the risk of 
overburdehing monetary policy. The Report did not seek to evaluate the impact 
of further reductions in public expenditure or increases in taxes. Instead the 
report came to the conclusion that the only policy objective was for governments 
to reduce interest rates that they could only do this if they reduced public sector 
deficits. The EU (1993) White Paper "Growth Competitiveness employment The 
Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21" makes the following remark, 
"At the end of the 1980s was the economy was growing strong 
unemployment stood at 12m. The explanations for the rigidty of unemployment 
are now clear. The relative high costs of unskilled labour is speeding up the 
rationalisation of investment and holding back job creation in services. This 
has resulted in the loss of millions of Jobs' (EU, 1993, page 11). 
The EU White Paper pointed out that in Spain and Germany growth rates 
had been in the range of 2 to 3 per cent per annum over the last 15 year yet 
unemployment ranged between 6 to 16 per cent. In contrast growth rates in 
UK and France had between 1.8 and 2.5 per cent annum yet unemployment 
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stayed around 9 per cent. The EU concludes that growth was no longer the 
solutaion to unemployment, and that therefore unemplyment in Europe was 
structural. 
Furthermore, the EU White paper comes to similar conclusions to the 
Central Bank Report when making suggestions for macro economic policy. The 
strain needs to be taken away from monetary policy so that room is made for 
the reduction of interest rates. Hard core unemployment is among male 
unskilled workers. The reason for the displacement of unskilled workers is the 
high cost of labour in Europe when compared with that the US and Japan. 
Another major element is non wage labour costs in Europe. 
(Annual report 1993 of the Committee of EC Central bank governors Bank of 
International Settlemants Basle Switzerland) 
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Between 1970 and 1991 statutory charges in Europe, which includes taxes 
and social insurance contributions, increased from 34.4 per cent to 39.6 per cent. 
In contrast in the US costs remained stable at 29 per cent. In Japan statutory 
charges did expand from 19 per cent in 1970 to 30 per cent in 1992 but this 
is still well below the European average. In Europe only the UK has reduced 
its non labour costs from 37 per cent in 1970 to 34.4 per cent in 1992. 
In an alternative language to that of the International Bankers, the IMF, 
the EU and the OECD, the recent ILO Report argues that the present strategies 
will continue to have deflationary implications for the global economy with 
no hope being offered to the unemployed. The ILO argues that the attempts 
to deregulate markets, the attempts to minimise the role of trade unions and 
the move away by governments from fiscal policy do not provide the foundations 
for better employment opportunities. The ILO points to countries which have 
been more interventionist as having better employment records. 
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CONCLUSION 
In dealing with unemployment there seems to be a widening gap between 
the rhetoric of policy statements and the reality of policy implementation. Whilst 
all governments in Europe would agree that unemployment possesses a major 
Challenge the policy options confirm a high degree of complacency. The 
determination by policy makers to deal with unemployment does not match 
the determination to deal with inflation, budget deficits and public expenditure. 
Governments have adopted deflationary monetary policies without evaluating 
the consequences for unemployment. 
'The deflationary monetary policies adopted in many European countries 
in the 1980s were the results of the constraints of ERM membership, and they 
could help to provide an explanation for the rise of unemployment throughout 
Europe' (Barrell 1994 p3S). 
In the aftermath of World War 2 governments committed themselves to 
full employment within a context of a devastated European Economy. At both 
national and international levels there was the political will to utilise fiscal policy 
accompanied by commitments to policy co-ordination on exchange rates, and 
creating social partnerships at the national level which made the commitment 
to full employment a possibility. By contrast the response to the oil price shock 
of the 1970s was to dismantle Bretton Woods to move to floating exchange rates 
and to make individual countries more vulnerable to speculative risk. Within 
the context of a global monetary economy individuals countries have tended 
to deflate their economies to avoid speculative risks against their individual 
currencies. 
A commitment to full employment in Europe cannot be achieved through 
fiscal expansion by individual countries. Both the UK and French attempts to 
go it alone confirm the limits of such a policy. At a European level policy 
coordination has to involve the move away from floating exchange rates to a 
more fixed exchange rate regime. The commitment to EMU could provide the 
climate for a stable exchange rate regime where countries in Europe will not 
have to compete in ratcheting up their interest rates to avoid currency 
speculation. Exchange rate stability together with stable interest rates could 
provide the framework for fiscal expansion, provided that countries pooled their 
external balances within a European context. 
The arguments for EMU and single currency should not over emphasise 
the advabtages of reducing transactions costs. The question is whether EMU 
will provide the necessary mechanisms for the co-ordination of monetary policy. 
A policy which would minimise speCUlative risks against any single currency 
and which would allow countries to reduce interest rates and move away from 
deflationary policies. 
Outside Europe there are at least three altenative approaches to reducing 
unemployment. First there is the US Free market model. The US has a highly 
deregulated labour market, low trade union density, and a record of high job 
3S 
creation when compared with Europe. The willingness of the Reagan and Bush 
administrations to expand budget deficits while encouraging a flexible labour 
market helped to expand employment participation. In 1995 the US 
unemployment rate was 6 per cent of the total labour force in contrast to 10 
per cent in Europe. One consequence of the US has been the widening wage 
disparties between the top ten per cent of earners and the rest, and also the 
lack off improvement is real wages over the last decade. A Second model is 
offered by Japan with its highly regulated approach to the market economy 
and the willingness of government (through MlT!) to intervene in industry to 
ensure continuing investment in new technology industries. Japan offers a 
unitary approach to industrial relations with companies seeking to secure the 
loyalty of core employees though their employment for life approach. The third 
model is that offered by the Asian Tigers with their commitment to business 
corporatism combined with low wages, low government expenditure, and low 
inflation. 
At a European level there are two possible alternatives. First there is the 
Deregulated market approach associated with the Neo classicals, the model 
being offered by the USA and the UK. This approach suggests there the priority 
should be removing labour market rigidities. This implies a strategy for lowering 
labour costs to make Europe competitive in the context of glodal economy. 
In the UK of the 1990s people are working longer hours for lower wages. There 
has been major increases in productivity together with a shift from direct to 
indirect taxes. Non statutory labour costs in Britain have continued to fall over 
the past decade in contrast to the rest of Europe where costs have continued 
to increase. Despite these measures the UK has experienced deeper and longer 
recessions in the 1980s. The flexible labour market has led to easier hiring and 
firing policies which means that during the early part of a recessions more 
workers tend to lose their jobs although they are reabsorbed early at the 
beginning of the recovery cycle. The increased casualisation of the labour market 
means that there is reluctance by employers to invest in the human capital of 
their employees. 
The European model is founded on the concept of consensus building, 
institutionalised bargaining together with a commitment to full employment. 
The model of the social market is seen as making a major contribution to the 
German economic miracle of the post war. Variants of this model have operated 
in the Nordic countries and attempts have been made in France and the 
Netherlands to move towards a consensus builing model. German 
unemployment which peaked at around 8.5 per cent continues to be lower than 
that of the UK, Belgium, Ireland or Italy. 
At present the European corporatist model also seems to be coming apart. 
In Sweden the new Government of Carlsson has come under immense pressure 
from the financial sector to produce policies which seek to reduce the fiscal 
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deficit. Since November 1995 the Swedish Governments have announced 
expenditure for the next three years amounting to £12bn in the hope that the 
government reduces the PSBR from 13 per cent to 7 per cent. Within the context 
of EMU the Swedish government will come under pressures to reduce its deficit 
further if it is to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. In Germany 
employees are asking the government to reduce non labour costs. Germany 
is coming under pressure from the emerging Eastern European states especially 
from the Czech Republic which has a highly skilled labour force and low wages. 
Increasingly derman employers are moving towards a UK view of 
competitiveness and are seeking to break with national bargaining and are 
asking government to secure reductions in the social security budget. 
All these models offer only limited lessons. Europe has a tradition of a 
commitment to state welfare and the incorporation of both business and trade 
unions in economic policy making. The question is whether Europe in the 
context of a global economy has inevitably. To compete with the Pacific Rim 
and Eastern Europe by encouraging workers in Europe 'to compete' through 
reducing wages and non wage labour costs or can Europe compete and provide 
employment combined with high quality welfare and high' wages? 
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